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I. INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 2018, I had occasion to write a book re-
view1 of How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt.2  
The book has its flaws, including practicing the kind of partisanship 
that it highlights and claims to deplore.  But, whatever the book’s flaws, 
Levitsky and Ziblatt clearly demonstrate that it can happen here—our 
democracy can actually die—by contrasting the decline of democratic 
norms in America over the past forty-five years with countries in which 
*  Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.  Persons interested
in the Pro-Democracy Caucus described infra are encouraged to contact the author. 
1. Bruce Ledewitz, What Has Gone Wrong and What Can We Do About It?,
54 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (book review). 
2. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018).
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similar experiences led to dictatorial rule.3  According to the authors, 
the fundamental change that explains the end of democratic systems is 
the decline of tolerance for rule by the other side and the resulting end 
of forbearance against using all legal means to prevent that outcome.4  
When political competition becomes unremitting warfare, democracy 
may come to an end. 
Who can doubt that this describes America today?  Levitsky and 
Ziblatt demonstrate the various ways that American politicians do eve-
rything in their power to stymie effective government when the other 
side is in power and to entrench their rule when they are in office.5 
The flaw in the book is the authors’ tendency to associate all or 
most such actions with Republicans in the beginning of America’s 
democratic decline and to ascribe to Democrats mere reaction.  This 
partisanship in outlook is surely irrelevant today.  The Democrats re-
took the House of Representatives in the 2018 congressional elections,6 
and they will probably eventually impeach President Donald Trump, 
however much or little actual evidence there is of his wrongdoing.  If 
Democrats retake the Senate, they will block any Trump Administra-
tion, or other Republican Administration, Supreme Court nominees 
from confirmation.7  These actions would be clear violations of the 
norms of tolerance and forbearance.  Whoever started it, this is where 
we are now. 
Generally, when I raise these concerns with others, my fears of 
democracy’s end are ridiculed as overblown or met with the peculiar 
reassurance that since we have never really had democracy we could 
not be losing it.  It is one purpose of this Article to show that actual 
dictatorship might be around the corner, whether by military coup or 
by a cancellation of elections that a substantial number of Americans 
might well support.8  That, and not any theoretical construct, is what I 
3. Id. at 2–10.
4. Id. at 8–10.
5. See id. at 145–75.
6. Live Midterm Results: House Races, WASH. POST,  https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/election-results/house/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1b4fcf0de418 (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2019). 
7. For a short response to the actual results of the November 2018 elections,
see infra Addendum. 
8. More than half of Republicans in theory, at least, support a cancellation of
the 2020 election.  See Jessica Estepa, Poll: More than Half of Republicans Would 
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mean by the end of democracy.  However undemocratic our system of 
government has been in the past, we have not been a dictatorship. 
If I am right that the end of democracy is possible, Americans 
should not be practicing business as usual.  We should all be concen-
trating intensely on how to step back from the precipice.  It is a second 
purpose of this Article to suggest that American law professors have a 
special obligation to address the crisis.  I have made such suggestions 
before,9 but now we are considering not merely the renewal of democ-
racy, but actually saving it.  This Article ends with a call for the creation 
of a pro-democracy, bipartisan caucus of American law professors that 
will not only defend democratic principles publicly but also will use its 
influence with the Justices on the United States Supreme Court (“U.S. 
Supreme Court”) to convince them to aid in the effort to save democ-
racy. 
The hour is late.  I hope not too late. 
II. HOW WILL AMERICAN DEMOCRACY END?: TWO NIGHTMARE
SCENARIOS 
A. The Gathering Storm10
As recently as Ronald Reagan’s Presidency, the notion of bipar-
tisanship was alive and well.  As controversial as Ronald Reagan was 
among many Democrats, he was a good friend of the Democratic 
Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill.11  Substantial numbers of Demo-
crats in Congress voted for much of the Republican President’s agenda, 
including his tax cuts.12  That kind of bipartisanship was also true of all 
Support Postponing 2020 Election, USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2017, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/08/10/52-percent-re-
publicans-would-support-postponing-2020-election/555769001/.  Who can say what 
number of Democrats would support cancellation of the 2020 election if that were the 
only way to block President Trump’s reelection? 
9. See Bruce Ledewitz, The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools in the
Renewal of American Democracy, 12 U. MASS. L. REV. 230, 258 (2017). 
10. With apologies to Winston Churchill, 1 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, The Gath-
ering Storm, in THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1948).
11. See generally CHRIS MATTHEWS, TIP AND THE GIPPER: WHEN POLITICS
WORKED (2013).
12. See Christopher Ingraham, The Top Tax Rate Has Been Cut Six Times Since
1980—Usually with Democrats’ Help, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2019),
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other important policy initiatives in the twentieth century—the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, the Endangered Species Act, and on and on.13 
Obviously, something has changed.  The Affordable Care Act 
passed Congress without a single Republican vote.14  The recent Re-
publican tax cut passed without a single Democratic vote.15 
This revolution of hyper-partisanship is the reason that, after 
more than two centuries of use, the filibuster in the Senate, which ef-
fectively requires a 60-vote majority to pass a bill, has been restricted 
in considering judicial nominations and will probably eventually be 
eliminated altogether.  The filibuster existed on the shared assumption 
that it would not be used routinely but would only be invoked when 
something truly threatening to a Senate minority was introduced.16  The 
filibuster is not practical if both Parties invoke it for every important 
bill when the Party is in the minority.  You cannot continue to have a 
filibuster if it is used, as the Democrats recently threatened to do, to try 
to frustrate an ordinary tax cut.17  That tax cut may have been bad pol-
icy, but it was not any kind of threat to anyone.  It could easily have 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/02/27/top-tax-rate-has-been-cut-
six-times-since-usually-with-democrats-help/?utm_term=.6e3763c73ace. 
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.; Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (1994). 
14. See Shailagh Murray & Lori Montgomery, House Passes Health-Care Re-
form Bill Without Republican Votes, WASH. POST (March 22, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2010/03/21/AR2010032100943.html. 
15. See Thomas Kaplan & Alan Rappeport, Republican Tax Bill Passes Senate
in 51-48 Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/12/19/us/politics/tax-bill-vote-congress.html. 
16. See Senator Olympia J. Snowe, The Effect of Modern Partisanship on Leg-
islative Effectiveness in the 112th Congress, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 28 (2013) (“But 
to those who view the filibuster as a tool to slow the action of the Senate in order to 
provide appropriate time to consider legislation, eliminating or significantly changing 
the filibuster represents a threat to minority rights, essentially blocking the minority 
from having a say in the final passage of any legislation.”). 
17. This is the reason that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 had to pass the
Senate by means of budget reconciliation—to avoid a threatened Democratic Party 
filibuster.  See Mike Debonis, Erica Werner & Damian Paletta, Senate Republican Tax 
Plan Clears Hurdle with Help from Two Key GOP Holdouts, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 28, 
2017, 8:21 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-trump-
taxes-agenda-20171128-story.html. 
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been reversed later.  If majority rule means anything, you cannot re-
quire sixty votes to pass every important bill. 
This increase in partisanship can also be seen in the current po-
litical attitude—that the most important thing for each Party is that the 
other Party’s president be brought to failure.  The Republican Party 
began to manifest this attitude during Bill Clinton’s presidency, when 
Clinton’s first budget passed without a single Republican vote in Con-
gress.18  And this Republican attitude was perfectly symbolized by 
Mitch McConnell’s comment in 2010 that “[t]he single most important 
thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term pres-
ident.”19 
But McConnell, in those same comments, at least held out the 
possibility of cooperation with President Obama, even if he regarded 
such cooperation as unlikely to happen.20  The Democrats, in their turn, 
have now perfected this partisan attitude regarding President Trump. 
The New York Times reported on April 8, 2018, that the Republicans 
are now running their 2018 congressional campaign on the theme that 
the first thing a new Democratic majority in the House would do is 
impeach President Trump.21  There is every reason to believe that this 
would be the case, even though there has not yet been any actual evi-
dence of serious wrongdoing by President Trump.  Many Democrats 
just hate President Trump and everything he stands for.  That hatred is 
grounds for opposition, not impeachment. 
The important question is, how did this revolution of hyper-par-
tisanship happen?  In a chapter fatefully entitled The Unraveling, Levit-
sky and Ziblatt bookend two events—the Senate’s failure to consider 
President Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to replace the 
18. See David E. Rosenbaum, The Budget Struggle; Clinton Wins Approval of
His Budget Plan as Gore Votes to Break Senate Deadlock, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, 
at 1, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/07/us/budget-struggle-clinton-wins-ap-
proval-his-budget-plan-gore-votes-break-senate.html. 
19. See Glenn Kessler, When Did McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obama





21. See Jonathan Martin, Republicans Seize on Impeachment for Edge in 2018
Midterms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/us/poli-
tics/trump-impeachment-midterms.html. 
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late Justice Antonin Scalia in 2016 and the introduction of a new form 
of partisan warfare in 1978 by a young Newt Gingrich.22  These evi-
denced the breakdown of the democratic norms of tolerance and for-
bearance.23 
Much of that partisan conflict played out at the federal level, 
such as the first use of impeachment without bipartisan support against 
President Bill Clinton.24  But the conflict at the national level basically 
intensified the tactics of existing political power relations between the 
Parties. 
A more fundamental change, because it involved a deliberate 
strategy to obtain and keep power, occurred with the 2003 Texas legis-
lature’s gerrymander vote.  The custom had been to redistrict only with 
a new census count, but the Republican majority in the legislature un-
dertook a rare mid-decade redistricting, aimed “as they themselves ad-
mitted, . . . only at partisan advantage.”25  The goal was to help ensure 
continued Republican Party control of the House of Representatives, 
which succeeded; the Texas gerrymander was seen as ensuring that 
control “‘no matter the national mood.’”26 
Levitsky and Ziblatt omit the denouement of the story, which 
was the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to find the gerrymander uncon-
stitutional in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry.27  Jus-
tice Kennedy found the issue of the partisan gerrymander to be justici-
able but argued that no satisfactory standard for a constitutional 
violation had been developed.28  Justice Kennedy failed to accept the 
plaintiffs’ suggestion that, at the very least, a kind of presumptive un-
constitutionality should be applied to such an unusual process as a mid-
decade redistricting:  “Under appellants’ theory, a highly effective par-
tisan gerrymander that coincided with decennial redistricting would re-
ceive less scrutiny than a bumbling, yet solely partisan, mid-decade re-
districting.”29 
22. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 145–175.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 150–51.
25. Id. at 154.
26. Id. at 155 (quoting an aide to Republican Congressman Joe Barton).
27. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
28. Id. at 423.
29. Id. at 419.
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Certainly it is true that acting against a redistricting plan that 
violates the norm of decennial redistricting would not have had any 
direct impact on equally partisan gerrymanders drawn at the usual 
time—in this case the 1991 Texas Democratic Party gerrymander, for 
example.  But Justice Kennedy failed to consider that holding that this 
violation of American democratic life’s usual norms rendered the re-
districting suspect would have had the effect of reinforcing those un-
written rules that Levitsky and Ziblatt identify as necessary to allow 
democratic practices to work.  Yes, the Republicans would have had to 
wait another seven years to redistrict, but that would just have yielded 
the usual and long-standing result of previous political practices.  Al-
lowing the ten-year norm to be breached failed to restrain, if it did not 
actively encourage, politicians pushing against the unwritten rules to 
see how far they could go.30 
By the time of the 2016 Presidential election, both sides were 
acting as if losing the election would yield the kind of catastrophic re-
sult that in other nations has encouraged extra-legal actions that result 
in democracy’s end.31  Some on the American political Right called the 
2016 election the “Flight 93” election, in an allusion to the desperate 
straits of the doomed flight on 9/11 that crashed when its passengers 
rose up against the airplane’s hijackers: 
     2016 is the Flight 93 election:  charge the cockpit or 
you die.  You may die anyway.  You—or the leader of 
your party—may make it into the cockpit and not know 
how to fly or land the plane.  There are no guarantees. 
     Except one:  if you don’t try, death is certain.  To com-
pound the metaphor:  a Hillary Clinton presidency is 
Russian Roulette with a semi-auto.  With Trump, at least 
you can spin the cylinder and take your chances.32 
30. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 154 (“The plan was pure hardball.
As one analyst posited, it ‘was as partisan as the Republicans thought the law would 
allow.’”). 
31. One example is the violent takeover in Chile that ousted Salvador Allende.
Id. at 2–6. 
32. Michael Anton, The Flight 93 Election, CLAREMONT INST. (Sept. 5, 2016),
https://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/the-flight-93-election/ (writing under the 
pseudonym Publius Decius Mus). 
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And this same sense of desperation motivated religious believ-
ers to fear that a Hillary Clinton Supreme Court would allow tax ex-
emptions to be stripped from any educational institution that refused to 
accept same-sex couples as married students.33 
In form, all of this was just a plea for supporting candidate 
Trump despite his obvious shortcomings.  But in tone, the sense was 
quite different.  The underlying message was that eight more years of 
a progressive presidency would have left people on the Right feeling 
like strangers in their own country, with no way back to a decent soci-
ety.  It certainly sounded like a willingness to take a chance on some 
system other than democracy if the election went the other way. 
As for the Democrats, it was clear they considered that Trump 
and his supporters were beyond the pale.  Substantial numbers of 
Trump supporters—half in fact—were regarded as “deplorables,” in 
candidate Clinton’s memorable phrase.34 
The Democrats would have been just as desperate as the Repub-
licans during the election, except that they never expected Donald 
Trump to be elected President.35  Since Trump’s election, however, the 
very same tone has been present on the Left as was the case with the 
Flight 93 rhetoric.  For Vann R. Newkirk II at The Atlantic, for exam-
ple, the Trump victory was “the embodiment of over 50 years of re-
sistance to the policies Martin Luther King[,] Jr. fought to enact.”36  
The most common description of opposition to President Trump had 
33. See Bruce Ledewitz, Is Religion a Non-Negotiable Aspect of Liberal Con-
stitutionalism?, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 209, 228 (2017) (“The outpouring of white, 
religious votes for President Trump occurred in part because of a suggestion in oral 
argument in Obergefell that religious institutions might lose their tax exempt status if 
they failed to adapt a judicial decision constitutionalizing gay marriage.”). 
34. See Katie Reilly, Read Hillary Clinton’s ‘Basket of Deplorables’ Remarks
About Donald Trump Supporters, TIME (Sept. 10, 2016, 12:27 PM), 
http://time.com/4486502/hillary-clinton-basket-of-deplorables-transcript/. 
35. See Eric Bradner, 5 Surprising Lessons from Trump’s Astonishing Win,
CNN (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/donald-trump-wins-
biggest-surprises/index.html. 
36. Vann R. Newkirk II, Five Decades of White Backlash, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
15, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/trump-massive-re-
sistance-history-mlk/550544/. 
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nothing to do with winning the next election against him—it was re-
sistance.37  Trump could not be allowed to be normalized.38  He was 
“not my President.”39 
From the beginning of President Trump’s ascension to power, 
there have been sporadic calls, even in mainstream forums, for actual 
violence in the streets.40  There were street protests essentially from the 
day he was elected, culminating in the huge, worldwide Women’s 
March on January 17, 2017.41  In a relatively new phenomenon in 2018, 
members of the Trump Administration and other prominent conserva-
tives have been physically confronted in their daily activities and asked 
to leave some private businesses.42 
It is shocking, but cannot be considered unexpected, therefore, 
that a poll in August 2017 found that 52% of Republican affiliated 
Americans would support postponing the 2020 election if President 
Trump said that was needed to prevent illegal voting.43  There were 
37. See, e.g., Rebecca Solnit, The 11 Biggest Victories Against Trump by the
Resistance, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2017/dec/02/biggest-victories-trump-resistance. 
38. See, e.g., Zoe Williams, The Dangerous Fantasy Behind Trump’s Normal-
isation, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/nov/15/dangerous-fantasy-donald-trump-normalisation-us-president-
elect-barbarism. 
39. Matea Gold et al., ‘Not My President’: Thousands Protest Trump in Rallies
Across the U.S., WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/11/10/not-my-president-thousand-protest-
trump-in-rallies-across-the-u-s/?utm_term=.93c80de51f6d. 
40. See, e.g., Jesse Benn, Sorry Liberals, a Violent Response to Trump Is as
Logical as Any, HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2017), https://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/jesse-benn/sorry-liberals-a-violent-_b_10316186.html. 
41. See Anemona Hartocollis & Yamiche Alcindor, Women’s March High-
lights as Huge Crowds Protest Trump: ‘We’re Not Going Away,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/us/womens-march.html. 
42. See Mary Jordan, The Latest Sign of Political Divide: Shaming and Shun-
ning Public Officials, CHI. TRIB. (June 24, 2018, 8:20 PM), http://www.chicagotrib-
une.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-shaming-public-officials-20180624-
story.html. 
43. Jessica Estepa, Poll: More than Half of Republicans Would Support Post-
poning 2020 Election, USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/08/10/52-percent-republicans-would-
support-postponing-2020-election/555769001/; see also LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra 
note 2, at 2–10. 
1314 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 49 
justified criticisms of the poll’s methodology,44 but the larger question 
of the popular commitment to democracy today remains.  Even before 
Trump’s election, there were questions about support for democracy 
and free expression, especially among the young.45  In the prescient 
words of Yascha Mounk, published before the 2016 voting, “the Amer-
ican public has never been as skeptical of democracy or as open to au-
thoritarian alternatives like military rule as it is right now.”46 
It is against this background that I present my two nightmare 
scenarios, in which the remaining tattered norms of democratic life 
might be finally, irreversibly torn. 
B. Fragmenting the Electoral College
One of the great ironies of American constitutional history is 
that Donald Trump lost the national popular vote by a pretty large mar-
gin—over 2.8 million votes—and received only 46.09% of the vote 
compared to Hillary Clinton’s 48.18%, and yet was still elected Presi-
dent.47  The reason, of course, was the Electoral College, in which 
Trump received 304 votes compared to 227 votes for Clinton.48 
The Electoral College outcome differed from that of the national 
vote because Clinton won very large margins in some of the states she 
carried while narrowly losing important states in the Upper Midwest.  
The election essentially came down to approximately 77,000 votes in 
Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.49  Since almost all states allot 
44. David A. Graham, Do Republicans Actually Want to Postpone the 2020
Election?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2017/08/poll-republicans/536472/. 
45. Id.
46. Yascha Mounk, Yes, American Democracy Could Break Down, POLITICO 
(Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/trump-american-
democracy-could-break-down-214383. 
47. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, OFFICIAL 2016 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL 
ELECTION RESULTS (2016), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgere-
sults.pdf. 
48. Id.  Seven so-called faithless electors cast their votes for persons other than
the one to whom they were pledged.  Randy Yeip, Tallying Up the ‘Faithless Elec-
tors,’ WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/graphics/electoral-college-2016/ (last up-
dated Dec. 20, 2016, 12:35 PM). 
49. See John McCormack, The Election Came Down to 77,744 Votes in Penn-
sylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 10, 2016, 3:45 PM), 
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all their electoral votes to the candidate who wins the state’s total 
vote—a winner-take-all system50—this kind of divergence in outcome 
is easy to understand. 
The reason that this outcome was so ironic is that, as argued by 
Levitsky and Ziblatt, the Framers of the Constitution created the mech-
anism of the Electoral College precisely to keep the people from elect-
ing an outsider with authoritarian tendencies51—some would say pre-
cisely to keep someone like Donald Trump from becoming President. 
The Framers feared that the people would be seduced by “dema-
gogues,” in the words of Hamilton.52  Yet in 2016, it was this gatekeep-
ing device that failed.  In contrast, the people rejected Donald Trump. 
For all the controversy about President Trump’s election, there 
was substantially less bitterness about this minority candidate outcome 
in 2016 than there had been about the closely contested 2000 election 
because everyone could see how President Trump had won.  Everyone 
knew going into the election that lopsided victories in big states could 
be offset by narrow losses elsewhere in terms of the Electoral College 
result.  President Trump was not installed by the U.S. Supreme Court,53 
or any other outside factor, but won fair and square under the rules as 
they had always existed in the modern era. 
But now imagine the reaction by Trump supporters if, prior to 
the voting, Democrats in Texas, Florida, and Pennsylvania had man-
aged to change the method of distributing electoral votes from winner-
take-all to distribution by congressional district wins.  Secretary Clin-
ton would still have had the strong starting base of California and New 
York as winner-take-all states, but the roughly 85 electoral votes that 
Trump should have won by winning those three states would instead 
have been divided between the candidates.  If the divisions were close 
enough, Secretary Clinton could have won the Electoral Vote count and 
thus the presidency. 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/john-mccormack/the-election-came-down-to-77-
744-votes-in-pennsylvania-wisconsin-and-michigan-updated.
50. Only Nebraska and Maine follow a different system.  See Maine & Ne-
braska, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/maine_nebraska (last visited Mar. 26, 
2019), for a discussion of how Maine and Nebraska distribute their votes. 
51. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 39–40.
52. Id. at 39 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton)).
53. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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One can easily imagine what the reaction would have been from 
the Trump campaign to this manipulation of the preexisting rules.  Even 
before the voting, Trump had predicted that the election would be 
“rigged.”54  Undoubtedly, some of his supporters would have taken to 
the streets.  Considering the strong support that gun rights groups gave 
to Trump, perhaps even armed supporters would have taken to the 
streets in protest. 
Now combine this genuine political grievance with the Flight 93 
rhetoric, and you can see the beginnings of an armed rebellion against 
the federal government that could have led to military intervention—
first as ordered by Presidents Obama and Clinton, but after that, who 
knows?  Perhaps disaffected army officers would have wanted a less 
liberal alternative government. 
Of course, my hypothetical outcome to the 2016 voting is wildly 
unrealistic.  Why would the Texas and Florida legislatures, which the 
Republican Party dominates, make a change that would be likely to 
harm a Republican presidential candidate?  Texas is a reliably Repub-
lican state in national elections, and Florida is a part of most Republi-
can Party plans to win the presidency. 
But if we now change the scenario slightly, a much more realis-
tic alternative emerges.  Imagine that those 77,744 votes in Pennsylva-
nia, Wisconsin, and Michigan had in fact changed from Trump to Clin-
ton.  Clinton, having won those three states, adds 46 electoral votes, 
Trump loses 46 votes, and Clinton narrowly wins the Electoral College 
with 273 votes.  So, the winner of the national vote becomes president 
after all. 
Except that in my hypothetical, she does not become president 
because all three state legislatures had previously changed the method 
of distributing electoral votes from winner-take-all to distribution by 
congressional district.  Instead of winning all 46 Electoral votes in these 
states, she wins only a plurality and comes up short in the Electoral 
College.  Now Clinton, the winner of the national vote, who would have 
won the presidency even under the normal operation of the Electoral 
College, loses to a man who lost the national vote and whose Party 
gamed the Electoral College to ensure the election of a Republican 
president.  Now the slogan “he is not my President” becomes “he is not 
54. See US Election 2016: Trump Says Election ‘Rigged at Polling Places,’
BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37673797. 
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really President,” and the grievance does not die away but festers.  And 
now the controversial Trump Administration policies that divide Amer-
ica would have been foisted on the country not by a wily politician who 
fairly won a narrow victory but by a stolen presidency.  If that would 
not be the end of democratic legitimacy in America, I don’t know what 
the end would look like. 
This is not really a fantasy because Republican legislators in 
those three states actually did consider making the change to congres-
sional district distribution after the 2012 election.  In all three states, 
Republicans at that time controlled both Houses of the Legislature and 
the Governorship and had the opportunity to make such a change.55  In 
fact, five states that often vote Democratic in national elections, includ-
ing Virginia and Ohio, considered making this change during this pe-
riod.56 
A move toward congressional district selection is really just a 
Republican Party plan to ensure permanent Republican rule of the pres-
idency.  One can see this because, in late 2011, the American Legisla-
tive Exchange Council (“ALEC”), whose motto, “Limited Govern-
ment, Free Markets, Federalism,”57 renders its partisan sympathy for 
the Republican Party perfectly clear,58 endorsed allocation of electoral 
votes based on congressional district results rather than by the winner-
take-all method.  This change, if enacted nationally before the 2012 
election, would have resulted in the election of Mitt Romney over 
Barack Obama despite the national vote59 and could be predicted to 
favor Republican presidential candidates going forward.  Estimates are 
55. See Ed Kilgore, Awarding Electoral Votes by Congressional District Is Be-




 57. About ALEC, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL,
https://www.alec.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
58. Salon calls it the GOP’s corporate front group.  See Alex Seitz-Wald,
GOP’s Corporate Front Group, SALON (Sept. 12, 2012, 12:27 AM), https://www.sa-
lon.com/2012/09/11/alecs_new_partner_the_gop/. 
 59. See Gaming the Electoral College, 270TOWIN, 
https://www.270towin.com/alternative-electoral-college-allocation-methods/ (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2019).  
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that if all states had moved to congressional district distribution, Clin-
ton could have won the national vote by 5% and still lost in the Elec-
toral College.60 
But the cynicism in this conspiracy is actually much worse than 
that because in actual political reality, there has been zero movement 
by Republican legislators in predictably Republican leaning states to 
make the change to congressional district distribution of Electoral 
votes.  In other words, the real policy being pushed is that Texas and 
Florida remain winner-take-all, while five states the Democrats usually 
win in national elections will be encouraged to move to congressional 
district selection.  ALEC and Republicans may claim that this is not 
their fault because each state makes this decision independently, but no 
effort will be made to limit the partisan impact by, for example, includ-
ing in the legislation a stipulation that no state will make this change 
until all others do so. 
All this activity is behind the scenes and involves the kind of 
legislative activity that ordinary Americans cannot be expected to fol-
low.  It will not become clear until the next presidential election is won 
by a Republican who loses the national vote, and the one after that, and 
the one after that.  Eventually, many Americans will conclude that we 
don’t have a democracy after all and will condone, if not support, the 
end of elections as, at least, a more candid approach.  They will adopt 
the attitude of Abraham Lincoln:  “When it comes to this I should prefer 
emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving lib-
erty—to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and 
without the base alloy of [hypocrisy].”61 
This nightmare scenario did not happen.  First, political fortunes 
shifted—Virginia elected a Democratic governor in 2014,62 for exam-
ple—and honorable Republican politicians hesitated to manipulate the 
60. See Harry Enten, Under a New System, Clinton Could Have Won the Pop-
ular Vote by 5 Points and Still Lost, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:28 AM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/under-a-new-system-clinton-could-have-won-
the-popular-vote-by-5-points-and-still-lost/. 
61. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Joshua F. Speed (Aug. 24, 1855),
https://www.nps.gov/liho/learn/historyculture/knownothingparty.htm. 
62. Trip Gabriel, Terry McAuliffe, Democrat, Is Elected Governor of Virginia
in Tight Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.ny-
times.com/2013/11/06/us/politics/mcauliffe-is-elected-governor-in-virginia.html. 
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Electoral College.  I have already written about the rumors that Repub-
lican Governor Tom Corbett put a stop to all such efforts in Pennsyl-
vania.63  I’m sure there were other unsung patriots elsewhere who did 
the same. 
But we came much closer to undermining American democracy 
than we realize.  This nightmare scenario almost happened.  Most dis-
couraging of all, many ordinary Republican politicians participated in 
this effort to move towards congressional district selection, heedless of 
its meaning for American democracy.  All they could see were partisan 
advantage and the illegitimate conduct of the Democrats that justified 
for them any measure that would prevent a loss of power.  In the words 
of the title of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s book, this is how democracies die. 
C. Packing the U.S. Supreme Court
As frightening as the previous scenario of fragmenting the Elec-
toral College is, we can take solace from the fact that it did not happen, 
and it does not seem likely that anything will threaten the Electoral 
College again for the foreseeable future.  Unfortunately, my second 
scenario, which is just as potentially dangerous to democracy as is the 
first, lies somewhere off in the future—and I judge that it is a fair bet 
to happen.64  In this scenario, it is the Democrats, not the Republicans, 
who will undermine, perhaps fatally, American democracy. 
The background for the second scenario is that the Republican 
Party has now engineered an ideological takeover of the U.S. Supreme 
Court by means of two strategies.  First was the refusal of the Republi-
can-controlled Senate to confirm any nominee of any Democratic pres-
ident.  I put the matter that way, instead of mentioning Judge Merrick 
Garland by name because it became clear from hints during the 2016 
election campaign that a Republican Senate was not going to confirm 
any U.S. Supreme Court nominee of a potential President Clinton.  In 
63. See Bruce Ledewitz, The Five Days in June When Values Died in American
Law, 49 AKRON L. REV. 115, 171 n.195. 
64. Indeed, the Court packing option is already being proposed.  See generally
DAVID FARIS, IT’S TIME TO FIGHT DIRTY: HOW DEMOCRATS CAN BUILD A LASTING 
MAJORITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2018).  See Harry Cheadle, The ‘Neutron Option’ 
Democrats Could Use to Retake the Supreme Court, VICE (June 29, 2018, 12:44 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ywe88j/the-neutron-option-democrats-could-
use-to-retake-the-supreme-court, for a discussion of this proposal with Faris. 
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the words of one strategist, the U.S. Supreme Court would just be al-
lowed to shrink.65  Thus, the number of Justices on the Court was in 
play and any means would be used to control the majority on the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Republicans might deny this now, but this is what was 
likely going to happen if Clinton had been elected. 
The second strategy is coordination between the Trump Admin-
istration and ideologically committed organizations in the selection of 
U.S. Supreme Court nominees.  In 2016, President Trump released a 
list of potential nominees, 21 persons in all, which had been prepared 
by the Federalist Society and the Heritage Foundation; eventual nomi-
nee Judge Neil Gorsuch was added to that list.66  Essentially, President 
Trump outsourced his search for a U.S. Supreme Court Justice.67 
In May 2017, President Trump stated that he would also select 
his next nominee from the same list,68 but this did not turn out to be the 
case.  In November 2017, President Trump announced an additional 
five names that he would consider, including Brett Kavanaugh, who 
became President Trump’s next nominee when Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy retired.69  The additions to the list did not indicate any lessening 
of conservative organizations’ influence, however.  White House coun-
sel Donald F. McGahn II announced the new names, as committed con-
servatives, at the Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Convention to 
pronounced and obvious support.70 
65. See Bruce Ledewitz, Has Nihilism Politicized the Supreme Court Nomina-
tion Process?, 32 BYU J. Pub. L. 1, 39 (2017). 
66. See Shane Goldmacher, Eliana Johnson & Josh Gerstein, How Trump Got
to Yes on Gorsuch, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2017, 11:09 PM), https://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2017/01/trump-supreme-court-gorsuch-234474. 
67. Id.
68. See Joseph P. Williams, Trump: Next Supreme Court Nominee Will Come
from Conservative List, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 1, 2017, 11:23 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-05-01/trump-next-supreme-
court-nominee-will-come-from-conservative-list. 
69. See Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh Is Trump’s Pick
for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court.html; Michael D. 
Shear, Trump Names Supreme Court Candidates for a Nonexistent Vacancy, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/us/politics/trump-su-
preme-court.html. 
70. Shear, supra note 69.
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The point of this kind of organized coordination is to prevent the 
nomination of another Justice David Souter—a presumed conservative 
Republican who ends up voting with liberals on the Court.71  Therefore, 
with the addition of Justice Kavanaugh to four already reliably con-
servative votes, Republicans have assured conservative control of the 
U.S. Supreme Court for the foreseeable future. 
And that future can be expected to last a long time.  Not only 
did the conservative groups that prepared President Trump’s lists try to 
ensure ideological consistency, they tried to ensure a long tenure by 
designating relatively young potential nominees.  Thus, Justice Gor-
such is currently 51 years old and Justice Kavanaugh, 54.72  You would 
expect them to serve at least 20 to 25 years on the Court.  In contrast, 
Judge Garland was 63 years old when President Obama nominated 
him73—his relatively advanced age perhaps a kind of failed olive 
branch to the Republican majority in the Senate. 
But what makes the Republicans think that this U.S. Supreme 
Court control is written in stone?  In this second nightmare scenario, 
the Democrats retake the Senate in 2020, as they couldn’t in 2018.  By 
then, President Trump might have even added one more U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice after Justice Kavanaugh.  It is crystal clear that once in-
stalled, no U.S. Supreme Court nominee by a Republican president will 
be confirmed.74  Democrats will invoke the sainted name of Judge Gar-
land, who is apparently destined to become the USS Maine of judicial 
71. See Scott Lemieux, Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court Nomination Is the
Result of Years of Unopposed Conservative Organizing, NBC NEWS: THINK (July 10, 
2018, 10:56 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-s-su-
preme-court-nomination-result-years-unopposed-conservative-ncna890226.  
72. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/jus-
tices/brett_m_kavanaugh (last visited Apr. 12, 2019); Neil Gorsuch, OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/justices/neil_gorsuch (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
73. Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It
Matters Now, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-
in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now. 
74. Andrew Prokop, 5 Ways the 2018 Midterms Could Change American Pol-
itics, VOX (Jan. 2, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-poli-
tics/2018/1/2/16795804/elections-2018-midterms-consequences (“[I]f Democrats re-
took the Senate, they could and likely would simply refuse to consider any Trump 
nominee for the seat—as Republicans did for Obama’s nominee Merrick Garland in 
2016.”). 
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politics.75  In terms of democratic norms’ decline, there will be no con-
firmations for the U.S. Supreme Court until a president and a Senate 
majority are comprised of the same Party. 
Obviously, that by itself would be bad enough, but a Democratic 
majority in the Congress would then be tempted to pack the U.S. Su-
preme Court because federal statute simply controls the number of Jus-
tices.76  There is nothing to prevent this except a presidential veto. 
Eventually, the Democrats will control both Congress and the presi-
dency.  If they then expand the number of Justices, their justification 
will be both that the Republicans achieved their majority on the Court 
by unfair means, which will only be true in small part since only Justice 
Gorsuch will have been confirmed in what could be called an unfair 
way, and that the Republicans had been prepared to let the Court shrink, 
so why not expand it, which will be absolutely true whether the Repub-
licans admit it or not. 
Readers must remember that it was only the kind of informal, 
democratic norms underlying unwritten rules, which Levitsky and 
Ziblatt celebrate,77 that kept President Roosevelt from packing the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the original Court-packing plan of 1937.  FDR had 
large majorities in both Houses of Congress, and it was Democratic 
Party opposition that killed the plan.78 
Those kinds of informal norms, however, no longer carry pro-
hibitive weight.  It is the same as the norms that underlie not redistrict-
ing in mid-decade or not manipulating the Electoral College for parti-
san purposes.  These guardrails, as Levitsky and Ziblatt describe 
them,79 are gone. 
75. Id; see also The USS Maine Explodes in Cuba’s Havana Harbor, HIST.
(Nov. 24, 2009), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-maine-explodes. 
76. The Judiciary Act of 1869 was the latest change, setting the number of
Justices at 9, including the Chief Justice.  Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44, 
sec. 1. 
77. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 8–10.
78. See L. Patrick Hughes, Texas Democrats and the Court Fight of 1937,
AUSTIN COMMUNITY COLLEGE (1999), http://www.austincc.edu/lpat-
rick/his2341/tdemo.html (“It’s important to remember that the telling blow to FDR’s 
court reorganization bill was not the opposition of Republicans but the abandonment 
of the [P]resident by conservative Southerners of his own political party.”). 
79. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 8–10.
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If the Democrats really did expand the number of Justices on the 
U.S. Supreme Court to 13, let’s say, to retake the Court, anything like 
a rule of law would be ended and would be understood as ended.  The 
Republicans, in their turn, would be sorely tempted to do the same thing 
when they next controlled both branches.  We could end up with a U.S. 
Supreme Court of 21 or 25 Justices.  Order would not be restored until 
both sides agreed to end the warfare over the U.S. Supreme Court by, 
perhaps, a constitutional amendment freezing its size.  And when 
would that happen? 
What would provoke the Democrats to proceed in such a reck-
less fashion?  Unfortunately, the answer might well be that nothing can 
prevent it, no matter how restrained and reasonable the new U.S. Su-
preme Court majority proves to be.  There is a strong feeling among 
Democrats that the Republican majority in the Senate stole a U.S. Su-
preme Court seat and got away with it, thereby necessitating a re-
sponse.80 
But assuming that the Democrats are not determined, ruinously, 
to destroy the rule of law in this way, what decisions by the new con-
servative majority would lead Democrats to an action like expanding 
the U.S. Supreme Court? 
For all the careful planning and execution involved in the con-
servative takeover of the U.S. Supreme Court, and for all the im-
portance that President Trump’s supporters placed on control of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, it is not at all clear just what the new majority will 
do that might invite a radical Democratic response.  Surprisingly, since 
the point of the intense conservative push to identify reliable nominees 
is supposed to be to clone Justice Scalia,81 the new majority seems un-
likely to entrench originalism and textualism as a principled methodol-
ogy of constitutional interpretation.  After all, the first decision joined 
80. To get a sense of how Democrats feel about how the Merrick Garland nom-
ination played out, see David S. Cohen, Grand Theft Judiciary: How Republicans 
Stole the Supreme Court, ROLLINGSTONE (Nov. 14, 2016, 6:35 PM), https://www.rol-
lingstone.com/politics/politics-features/grand-theft-judiciary-how-republicans-stole-
the-supreme-court-128410/. 
81. See Larry Obhof, This Is Easy: Trump Needs to Nominate a Scalia Clone
for the Supreme Court, DAILY CALLER (July 7, 2018, 1:29 AM), http://dai-
lycaller.com/2018/07/07/trump-should-nominate-scalia-clone-for-supreme-court/ 
(using the words “Scalia Clone” in the headline). 
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by Justice Gorsuch, Trinity Lutheran Church, held that the Free Exer-
cise Clause requires a state to allow a church to participate in a state 
funded program.82  Whatever the merits of this decision, forcing a state 
to give money to a church is not facially consistent with any form of 
originalism, and no Justice made any attempt to square the decision 
with the Free Exercise Clause’s historic public meaning.83  This epi-
sode suggests that judges are never principled in the sense of applying 
consistent interpretive strategies. 
In terms of substantive decisions, the new conservative majority 
might overrule Roe v. Wade84 and Obergefell v. Hodges,85 but as sig-
nificant as that would be, such decisions are by no means a certainty, 
and in any event, would only return the underlying policies to ordinary 
politics in the states.  (There is zero indication that anyone on President 
Trump’s list would actually protect unborn life under the due process 
clauses).  In the consequent political struggle, abortion rights and same-
sex marriage might fare extremely well. 
Certainly, the new conservative majority on the U.S. Supreme 
Court will be much less inclined to give deference to interpretations of 
law by administrative agencies.  But again, decisions of that sort just 
empower Congress to clarify its policy choices.  No one is going to 
overturn American democratic life over the Chevron Doctrine.86 
It seems to me that only the same issue that provoked FDR 
would be enough to cause the Democrats to consider packing the U.S. 
Supreme Court—the reach of basic federal power under the Commerce 
Clause and economic due process limits.  If a new conservative major-
ity were to hold that Congress lacked authority to regulate against cli-
mate change, for example, I believe that a Democratic majority in Con-
gress would respond.  There are certainly those who hope for such 
rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court—Randy Barnett comes to 
82. Trinity Lutheran Church v. Mo. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2015–
16 (2017). 
83. For criticism along these lines, see Bruce Ledewitz, ‘Trinity’ Case Marks
End of Originalism, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 7, 2017, 3:01 AM), 
https://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/20170707__Trin-
ity__case_marks_end_of_originalism.html. 
84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
85. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
86. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2019 Taking the Threat to Democracy Seriously 1325 
mind87—but I am not sure the new Justices intend to go where Justice 
Scalia certainly never went,88 which would be back toward Lochner89 
and Carter Coal.90  Assuming that the Revolution of 1937 remains in-
tact, we might never reach this second nightmare scenario.91 
The issue that really unites the current conservative movement 
is protection of First Amendment rights—both in terms of speech, in-
cluding prohibiting any form of campaign finance limits or mandatory 
unionization, and the protection of religious liberty from anti-discrim-
ination laws.  Decisions like those are not likely to provoke a crisis for 
two main reasons.  First, the law is already trending in those direc-
tions—Citizens United,92 Janus,93 and Hobby Lobby94 are already the 
law, for example.  Second, marginal religious dissent is not having any 
real impact on the underlying rights in question, while Democrats are 
having some success in fighting against big money, and unions are 
growing.95 
But if worst really were to come to worst, and the Democrats 
really did expand the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn its decisions, the 
87. See Brian Beutler, The Rehabilitationists, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 30, 2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-movement-
undo-new-deal. 
88. Justice Scalia regularly criticized the substantive due process approach of
the Lochner era.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
89. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Thomas B. Colby & Peter
J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 562 (2015).
90. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
91. The phrase “Revolution of 1937” is generally taken to refer to the dramatic
diminishment of judicial invalidation of federal and state economic regulation after 
1936 under both commerce clause and due process doctrines.  See generally Keith E. 
Whittington, State Constitutional Law in the New Deal Period, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 
1141, 1144–50 (2015). 
92. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking
down limits on corporate campaign contributions). 
93. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018) (striking down “agency fees” required to be paid by nonmembers of public 
employee unions). 
94. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (vindicating a
closely held, for-profit corporation’s free exercise exemption claim based on the reli-
gious objections of the company’s owners). 
95. Dick Meister, Unions Are Growing—Finally, http://www.dickmeis-
ter.com/id240.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
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reaction from conservatives would be extreme.  The rhetoric of Flight 
93 would return.96  There would be strong feelings of persecution. 
There undoubtedly would be at least some instances of armed re-
sistance.  A lot of people would feel they have nothing to lose.  I don’t 
think people would wait to see what an expanded U.S. Supreme Court 
would actually do.  I don’t believe democracy would survive. 
III. SHOULD THE U.S. SUPREME COURT PLAY A ROLE IN THE
PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRACY? 
The question heading this section will strike most readers as ab-
surd.  Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court should play a role in the 
preservation of democracy and would certainly do so in an appropriate 
situation. 
As an example, President Trump has been referring to the press 
as the “enemy of the American people” since the beginning of his Ad-
ministration.97  Levitsky and Ziblatt consider his condemnations of a 
free press, to which one can add his threats to strengthen defamation 
law as applied to the media, as one indicator of President Trump’s au-
thoritarian tendencies.98 
But if President Trump actually attempted to bring a defamation 
action against a media outlet such as CNN or the New York Times, all 
of the Justices would apply the New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan stand-
ard of actual malice,99 which would not be satisfied in the sorts of in-
stances of which President Trump complains.100  On a matter like that, 
96. See Michael Anton, supra note 32 (discussing the Flight 93 rhetoric).
97. MARVIN KALB, ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE 1 (2018) (quoting a tweet by Presi-
dent Trump); Rebecca Morin, Trump Administration Splits Over Journalists as ‘En-
emy of the People,’ POLITICO (Aug. 2, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2018/08/02/trump-media-enemy-people-ivanka-white-house-760581. 
98. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 181–82.
99. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (“The constitutional guarantees require, we
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the state-
ment was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”).  Maybe not all the Justices agree 
with that standard; see McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the denial of certiorari).  
100. See Jasmine C. Lee & Kevin Quealy, The 567 People, Places and Things
Donald Trump Has Insulted on Twitter: A Complete List, N.Y. TIMES, 
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the makeup of the Justices on the Court, thankfully, does not matter at 
all.  The same result of protection of the press would occur with any of 
the names on the Federalist Society/Federalist Foundation nomination 
list discussed above.  This shows the deep reserves of constitutional 
bulwarks in our tradition. 
However, the point of this Article is that this kind of action by 
the Justices would not represent, and would not be understood as rep-
resenting, the preservation of democracy, except in an indirect sense. 
Instead, the Justices would be vindicating the individual right of a 
speaker to criticize a governmental official.  In other words, the protec-
tion would be individual and not structural.  In the context of speech, 
the First Amendment preserves democracy, while the U.S. Supreme 
Court protects the First Amendment. 
That may strike the reader as a distinction without a difference, 
which may be true in the area of speech.  But the distinction between 
individual rights and structure mattered a great deal in the two gerry-
mander cases that the Court “ducked” in the 2017 term.101 
The substantive issues that continue to arise for the U.S. Su-
preme Court are whether partisan gerrymanders are constitutional, 
whether that issue is justiciable, and if it is justiciable, what the stand-
ard should be for deciding it.  Those are the issues the Justices did not 
decide in these two cases.  In Gill v. Whitford, the Court unanimously 
held that the plaintiffs had not established standing102 and so, did not 
reach the merits of the gerrymandering claim.103   In Benisek v. Lamone, 
the Justices held in a per curiam opinion that the balance of equities 
and the public interest supported the refusal of the lower court judge to 
issue a preliminary injunction against a claimed gerrymandered Mary-
land congressional district.104 
The reason for the lack of standing in Gill demonstrates that the 
Justices are not primarily thinking in terms of democracy itself but only 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/28/upshot/donald-trump-twitter-in-
sults.html (last updated Feb. 20, 2019). 
101. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); see Benisek v. Lamone, 138
S. Ct. 1942 (2018).
102. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1926–34.  Justices Thomas and Gorsuch did not join the
portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion that remanded the case to give the plaintiffs 
another chance to do so.  See id. at 1941. 
103. Id. at 1934.
104. Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1945.
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in terms of individual rights.  Chief Justice Roberts rejected statewide 
claims of harm from a statewide gerrymander scheme’s operation be-
cause the right to vote is “individual and personal in nature.”105  A 
plaintiff therefore must allege that her own district is gerrymandered 
and may not complain that the districting plan as a whole alters the 
overall composition of the state legislature.  The opinion does not even 
mention democracy as the value that an anti-gerrymandering holding 
is meant to bolster.  Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts seems to hold spe-
cifically that harms to “group political interests”106 are not injuries for 
purposes of constitutional standing:  “[T]his Court is not responsible 
for vindicating generalized partisan preferences.  The Court’s constitu-
tionally prescribed role is to vindicate the individual rights of the peo-
ple appearing before it.”107 
Justice Kagan’s concurrence, on the other hand, begins with a 
strong condemnation of partisan gerrymandering’s effect on democ-
racy—“that practice enables politicians to entrench themselves in 
power against the people’s will.”108  But the thrust of her opinion is that 
standing in the case can be established pursuant to another individual, 
rights-based claim—the associational rights of individual voters to join 
together to form political parties and other associations.109 
At the end of the concurrence, in a section seeming to summa-
rize the gerrymandering issue, Justice Kagan again refers to the harms 
that “excessive partisan gerrymandering” do to the political system as 
a whole, including rendering “pragmatic, bipartisan solutions to the na-
tion’s problems” increasingly difficult to achieve.110  “[Partisan gerry-
mandering] enables a party that happens to be in power at the right time 
to entrench itself there for a decade or more, no matter what the voters 
would prefer.”111 
But, of course, Justice Kagan was speaking only for the four 
liberals on the Court at that point.  At least four Justices are thus open 
to a role for the Court as democracy’s caretaker.  The question for the 
105. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561
(1964)). 
106. Id. at 1933.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1935 (Kagan, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 1938–40 (Kagan, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1940 (Kagan, J., concurring).
111. Id.
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future is whether the new conservative majority will begin to see its 
responsibility to democracy in systemic terms. 
Gill is not an insurmountable barrier to raising a gerrymandering 
claim.  Standing pursuant to the majority opinion is not that difficult to 
establish.  So, the gap between an individualistic view and a structural 
view is not necessarily that significant in cases of this kind. 
But the difference between these two starting points for standing 
would be dramatically illustrated in my first nightmare scenario—the 
manipulation of the Electoral College.  Assume, for purposes of illus-
tration, that Republican legislators in the five states previously men-
tioned—Virginia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Ohio—
pushed through the change to congressional district delegate selection 
from their current winner-take-all systems.  Now assume further that 
during discovery in litigation filed to block this change, plaintiffs find 
a recording of an actual meeting between Republican legislative lead-
ers in those states and Republican legislative leaders in Texas and Flor-
ida, in which it was specifically agreed that to “ensure permanent Re-
publican Party rule at the Presidential level,” those five states would 
make this change, while Texas and Florida would not.112 
Arguably, under the majority view in Gill, there would be no 
individualized injury and therefore no standing to challenge this con-
spiracy against democracy.  After all, there is no constitutional require-
ment of a winner-take-all system, which is why the long-standing di-
vergent arrangements in Maine and Nebraska are constitutional.  
Therefore, this plot could only be considered a constitutional injury 
from a “nationwide” perspective, which would be subject to the same 
kind of criticism leveled in Gill against claims of statewide impact on 
the overall composition of a legislature.  The claim that the Republican 
112. Candid admissions like this do happen and are sometimes captured.  Con-
sider the 2012 statement by Pennsylvania state House Republican leader Mike Turzai 
seemingly admitting that the purpose of the voter ID law was to “allow” Mitt Romney 
to defeat Barack Obama in the 2012 Presidential election.  Kelly Cernetich, Turzai: 
Voter ID Law Means Romney Can Win PA, POLITICS PA (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.politicspa.com/turzai-voter-id-law-means-romney-can-win-pa/37153/. 
These comments were widely reported in the media and were not denied by Turzai.  
Of course, Representative Turzai might have meant that voter ID would do this legit-
imately by keeping thousands of people from casting illegal votes, but I doubt it. 
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candidate will now always be elected president would be seen as rep-
resenting a “generalized grievance” shared by all citizens, even those 
who vote in the rest of the nation. 
There is merit in the understanding that the Supreme Court’s 
role does not extend to overall oversight of the political system and its 
outcomes.  A detailed consideration of this view is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but one need only consider the effect of the Bush v. Gore113 
case on the perceived legitimacy of the Supreme Court to appreciate a 
modest judicial role.  Alan Dershowitz memorably referred to the Jus-
tices’ decision to intervene in the outcome of the 2000 presidential elec-
tion-voting in Florida, and then essentially award the presidency to 
George W. Bush on an equal protection theory in which the majority 
did not believe, as “the single most corrupt decision in Supreme Court 
history.”114  In that decision, as would be the case in my hypothetical, 
the motivation of the Justices to intervene was to prevent a constitu-
tional crisis, a crisis in democracy.  But the result was a catastrophe 
from the perspective of judicial legitimacy—“Judicial Lawlessness” in 
the words of Ward Farnsworth.115 
In my hypothetical, to head off an assault on democracy through 
the Electoral College’s manipulation, it would be necessary for the Jus-
tices to essentially do some constitutional architectural engineering.  
The fundamental problem is that the Electoral College was originally 
intended to perform a deliberative role116 it has long since lost.  Since 
a deliberative body no longer selects the President on personal merit, 
the only legitimacy that the presidential selection process can have in 
this modern age is some form of democratic imprimatur.  One can im-
agine retaining the winner-take-all national system on the ground that 
it is usually democratic in outcome and that its peculiarities can be jus-
tified by reference to the need for some form of broad geographic ap-
peal by a presidential candidate—a justification similar to that of the 
113. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
114. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT
HACKED ELECTION 2000, at 174 (2001). 
115. See generally Ward Farnsworth, “To Do a Great Right, Do a Little
Wrong”: A User’s Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227 (2001) (de-
scribing Bush v. Gore as a “lawless” opinion). 
116. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Beard Thesis and Franklin Roosevelt, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 114, 118 (1987). 
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Senate.  There is no reason to think the Framers would have chosen 
such a system, but they are not here to design a new one. 
But no one could justify a nationwide conspiracy to manipulate 
voting rules in different states just to achieve the partisan result of elect-
ing Republican presidents.  And once achieved, the corrupt scheme 
would not be easy to change.  The change would require as much na-
tional coordination as did the plot in the first place.  If the U.S. Supreme 
Court would have good reason not to interfere, therefore, there would 
also be compelling reasons for it to do so, even though the Justices 
would absolutely be in unchartered territory.  Intervention would not 
be justified on a strictly originalist theory, but it would not be prohib-
ited either. 
Aside from stopping an assault on democracy, the possibility of 
judicial intervention in my hypothetical scenario would have another, 
entirely different, but salutary, effect—a prophylactic one. 
Politicians may violate unwritten rules for partisan gain when 
democratic norms have disintegrated,117 but generally speaking, they 
do not violate the law.  Thus, Levitsky and Ziblatt describe the Repub-
lican effort in Texas in 2003 as determined to go as far as the law per-
mitted, but presumably, no further.118 
The same approach was present in the determined gerrymander-
ing that occurred after the 2010 Census.  As told by Michael Tomasky 
in reference to an account set forth in David Daley’s book, 
Ratf**ked,119 Republican operative Chris Jankowski realized that if a 
few state legislative seats were flipped in the 2010 election, the result-
ing gerrymandered House seats could practically assure Republican 
control of the House of Representatives for the next ten years.120  So, 
Jankowski organized a big money effort to obtain strategic majorities 
in selected state legislatures.121 
Now, in part, Daley’s breathless account amounts to nothing 
more than a political party trying to win elections and succeeding for a 
117. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 151 (describing one politician’s at-
titude toward paying lobbyists as “[i]f it wasn’t illegal, do it”). 
118. Id. at 154.
119. DAVID DALEY, RATF**KED: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN
TO STEAL AMERICA’S DEMOCRACY (2016). 
120. Michael Tomasky, Ratfucked Again, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (June
7, 2018), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/06/07/on-gerrymandering/. 
121. Id.
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variety of reasons, including dissatisfaction with the Democratic in-
cumbent President and a decline in Democratic Party voter participa-
tion.  If Jankowski could see what was at stake in the outcome of the 
2010 election, there is no reason why Democratic Party operatives 
would not have seen the same thing.  Jankowski had his epiphany after 
reading a story in the New York Times, not in a secret library.122 
But from the point of view of democracy as a whole, the episode 
represented the kind of waste that economic theory associates with cer-
tain forms of government regulation of the market.123  Simply put, there 
was too much at stake because of a failure of potential U.S. Supreme 
Court intervention.  If Republican Party strategists had needed to con-
sider a realistic possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court would invali-
date at least extreme versions of gerrymandering, they would have had 
less incentive to set the entire scheme in motion. 
That is something that a U.S. Supreme Court commitment to 
democracy would accomplish.  In terms of my hypothetical Electoral 
College scheme, which remember was not so hypothetical, a fear that 
for all the effort, the U.S. Supreme Court might find a way to invalidate 
the result and announce that under current conditions, no wholesale 
changes in the Electoral College would be permitted for fear of demo-
cratic sabotage, the effort would never be made in the first place, and 
the crisis would never happen. 
There is one more reason for the Justices to consider a much 
more active role in the preservation of democracy—times have 
changed; democratic norms have deteriorated; the unthinkable is now 
possible.  As Abraham Lincoln also said:  “As our case is new, so we 
must think anew, and act anew.  We must disenthrall ourselves, and 
then we shall save our country.”124 
The threat to democracy entailed by manipulation of the Elec-
toral College could have happened at any time in our past.  The reason 
122. DALEY, supra note 119, at xiii–iv.
123. Lobbying to acquire competitive advantage is referred to as rent seeking
because it “does not add value to the larger marketplace.”  David John Marotta, What 
Is Rent-Seeking Behavior?, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2013, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2013/02/24/what-is-rent-seeking-behav-
ior/#6e32045c658a. 
124. President Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress: Concluding Re-
marks (Dec. 1, 1862), in 5 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 518, 537 (Roy 
P. Basler et al., ed. 1953).
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it did not happen is simply that the unwritten rules created by adherence 
to the democratic norms of tolerance and forbearance prevented it.  It 
is also the case that a U.S. Supreme Court in prior years would not have 
intervened in a change to state Electoral College delegate selection.  
These two considerations are linked.  The fundamental reason for the 
U.S. Supreme Court to play a role in the preservation of democracy is 
that now such a role is necessary.  It was not necessary before. 
IV. WHAT COURTS SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT DO TO PRESERVE
DEMOCRACY 
Unfortunately, the Justices are likely to continue to practice 
business as usual.  They probably will be among the last to recognize 
the emergency.125  Part of the reason for that is that most law professors, 
some of whom are read by the Justices and are in communication with 
them, are also practicing business as usual, in the sense of not abandon-
ing partisan commitments in favor of an overall commitment to democ-
racy.  I will return to that theme in the last section. 
But if the Justices do become convinced, by recognition of the 
danger, to assume a new or more aggressive role as the guardians of 
democracy, the question will become:  what should the U.S. Supreme 
Court, lower federal courts, and state courts actually do?  Can the courts 
prevent the death of democracy? 
Basically, the answer is no, which is why the last section of this 
Article addresses actions by law professors going beyond litigation and 
court cases.  An important part of the analysis by Levitsky and Ziblatt 
is that democracies die by the decline of tolerance for rule by the other 
side and forbearance against taking all possible legal steps against 
one’s political opponents.126  Almost by definition, then, the actions 
125. A very good example of myopia by the Justices is Abbott v. Perez, 138 S.
Ct. 2305, 2313, 2324–25 (2018), in which Justice Alito held that the three-Judge panel 
erred in reversing the presumption of legislative good faith in the context of racial 
discrimination in drawing district lines because the district court had required a show-
ing of a “true change of heart” by the Texas legislature due to a finding of past dis-
criminatory intent.  But why should a legislature that has been shown to have discrim-
inated intentionally in recent years be treated the same as a legislature that never had 
done so?  Only a Court that is not really worried about electoral manipulation would 
rule this way. 
126. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 136–38.
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that destroy democracy tend, at least at first, to be technically legal and 
beyond the capacity of the courts to stop. 
A perfect example of the decline of democratic forbearance, and 
one mentioned by Levitsky and Ziblatt, is the weaponization of im-
peachment.127  Prior to the impeachment of President Clinton, impeach-
ment was not used as a purely partisan maneuver.  The authors say that 
no impeachments took place without at least some possibility of a con-
viction in the Senate; that convention was broken by the Clinton im-
peachment.128 
Whether this claim is historically justified, and indeed whether 
impeachment should be treated as an independent responsibility of the 
House of Representatives so that the legitimacy of impeachment is 
judged by its own standard, are not my focus here.  The point is that 
the decision by the House to impeach is undoubtedly a political ques-
tion, with which the U.S. Supreme Court will not interfere under any 
circumstances.129  Insofar as such an impeachment is a violation of 
democratic norms, it is a non-reviewable assault on democracy. 
This conclusion might be put to the test very soon.  At the mo-
ment, there are no valid grounds for impeachment of President Trump. 
Nevertheless, now that the Democrats have taken control of the House 
of Representatives after the 2018 election, I doubt they will practice 
forbearance.  Such a majority would be likely to impeach even without 
any new evidence against the President.  But, as I discussed above, the 
merits of such an action by the House would probably be considered a 
political question. 
This scenario illustrates why courts cannot stop the deterioration 
in democratic norms.  And any number of other examples could be 
given.130  If our politicians are truly determined to destroy democracy, 
they will succeed. 
But that reality shows only how important it is for courts to act, 
and to act aggressively, when they can.  Perhaps the courts can restrain 
127. Id. at 150–51.
128. See id. (discussing how the investigation into President Clinton did not find
anything reaching the level of “high crimes and misdemeanors”). 
129. Cf. United States v Nixon, 506 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993).
130. The Court cannot, for example, force a recalcitrant Senate majority to con-
firm a qualified U.S. Supreme Court nominee by a President of the other Party. 
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our politicians to some extent by mobilizing public support for demo-
cratic norms and by actually preventing some of the worst partisan 
abuses. 
In what sorts of cases should the courts act?  Serious arguments 
can be made that democracy is threatened in all sorts of ways—by 
overly activist courts nationalizing abortion rights or same-sex mar-
riage, for example, or by judicial constitutionalizing of unlimited cor-
porate and individual campaign expenditures.  But these matters are not 
what Levitsky and Ziblatt mean by the death of democracy.  They have 
in mind much more direct threats, such as trying to keep political op-
ponents out of power by restricting the opponent’s supporters’ voting 
rights through voter ID laws or limiting the effectiveness of their votes 
through effective gerrymandering.131  It is in terms of these kinds of 
threats that the court could help to preserve democracy, both directly, 
through case outcomes, and indirectly, through democratic rhetoric and 
deterrence. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has been ineffective both in recogniz-
ing the danger to democracy in such practices and in formulating effec-
tive standards to restrict their use.  Obviously those two failures are 
related.  If the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the danger, the Justices 
would be more likely to act and to create the conditions in which lower 
courts would know how to act as well. 
In upholding an Indiana voter ID law, in Crawford v. Marion 
County,132 the Justices failed to take seriously the law’s impact on po-
tential voters.  This holding is in contrast to the approach of the U.S. 
Supreme Court to third-party candidate ballot access, where the Jus-
tices have not hesitated to strike down restrictive laws.133  In Crawford, 
there was no majority opinion.  The plurality opinion by Justice Ste-
vens134 and the concurrence in the judgment by Justice Scalia135 made 
up a six-Justice bloc upholding Indiana’s requirement of government 
issued photo-identification for voting. 
131. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 183–86, 209–12.
132. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
133. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (striking down un-
reasonably early filing deadlines for independent candidates running for President). 
134. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 185–204 (plurality opinion) (joined by Roberts, C.J
& Kennedy, J.). 
135. Id. at 204–09 (Scalia, J. concurring) (joined by Alito & Thomas, JJ.).
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These two opinions treated the issue of intent very differently. 
For Justice Stevens, a voting regulation must be justified by “relevant 
and legitimate state interests,”136 but if those interests are present, they 
justify a law even if “partisan interests . . . provided one motivation for” 
the law.137  Justice Stevens acknowledged the possibility that the 
unique burdens imposed on individual voters might overcome the 
state’s general interests, but Justice Stevens doubted that showing 
could be made.138 
For Justice Scalia, on the other hand, the burden on individual 
voters was completely irrelevant:  “The Indiana photo-identification 
law is a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation, and 
our precedents refute the view that individual impacts are relevant to 
determining the severity of the burden it imposes.”139  But at least Jus-
tice Scalia did not denigrate the effect of proof of discriminatory intent, 
as Justice Stevens seemed to do.  The problem for Justice Scalia was 
that there had been no actual proof in the case of discriminatory in-
tent.140 
In terms of intent, there was no reason for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to take Indiana’s neutral justifications seriously.  Voter ID laws 
are nothing more than a partisan strategy to suppress some number of 
Democratic-leaning voters from voting.141  That intent alone should be 
enough to trigger strict scrutiny.  But, in 2008, not one Justice was will-
ing or able to acknowledge the obvious partisan background of these 
laws. 
It may be that the Justices are finally beginning to grapple seri-
ously with partisan advantage as an illegitimate factor in voting rights 
cases.  In Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,142 
a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court was willing to assume “without de-
ciding, that partisanship is an illegitimate redistricting factor” in a case 
concerning population discrepancies among voting districts.143 
136. Id. at 191.
137. Id. at 204.
138. See id. at 200–01.
139. Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 207.
141. See Cernetich, supra note 112 (discussing a statement by House Repre-
sentative Mike Turzai). 
142. 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016).
143. Id. at 1310.
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In the context of partisan gerrymandering, reference was made 
above to the two most recent cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
continues to flounder, unable either to permit unrestricted partisan ger-
rymandering or to establish a standard by which lower courts could find 
such gerrymanders unconstitutional.144  As stated above, the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s failure at the very least to find departures from normal 
practices constitutionally suspect in League of United Latin American 
Citizens145 was particularly obtuse.  Departures from the norm are just 
the sort of behavior that Levitsky and Ziblatt are highlighting in the 
decline of democratic norms and the violation of respected conven-
tions. 
The failure of the Justices in League of United Latin American 
Citizens was especially hard to understand because in other cases, nov-
elty does render a statute suspect.  Thus, in United States v. Windsor,146 
one factor in striking down the Defense of Marriage Act was that its 
departure from the “history and tradition” of reliance on state law to 
define marriage suggested careful consideration in reviewing the 
law.147  Similarly, in Shelby County v. Holder,148 it was a “dramatic 
departure from the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty” 
that required a higher level of justification of Section 4 of the Voting 
Rights Act.149 
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure, Chief Justice 
Ronald Castille of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a more forth-
right stance toward both legislative redistricting and voter ID laws—
one much more likely to preserve democracy, because of its outcome, 
its rhetoric, and because of his Party affiliation. 
In the gerrymandering case, Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reappor-
tionment Commission,150 Chief Justice Castille recognized the inevita-
ble political element in drawing district lines but pointed out that the 
limits and standards in the Pennsylvania Constitution “exist precisely 
144. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 313 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that as of yet, there is no standard to measure unconstitutional gerrymanders, 
but one may emerge in the future). 
145. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 477 (2006).
146. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
147. Id. at 768.
148. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
149. Id. at 535.
150. 38 A.3d 711 (Pa. 2012).
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as a brake on the most overt of potential excesses and abuse.”151  
Granted, the Chief Justice had the advantage of a constitutional process 
that includes review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,152 thus con-
ferring automatic legitimacy on such review.  Nevertheless, his ap-
proach shows that there need be no discrete, either-or decision about 
whether a plan is excessive in its treatment of political factors, com-
pared to traditional districting values, such as compactness and cohe-
sion.  A court can accept a certain level of partisan manipulation as long 
as the neutral and traditional criteria of districting are mainly followed. 
There is nothing wrong with a judge using common sense judgment 
even in this controversial arena. 
In the voter ID case, Applewhite v. Commonwealth,153 Chief Jus-
tice Castille did not rule on the ultimate merits but rather established 
the standard for judging new voting regulations.  The Commonwealth 
must carry the burden of showing that there will be no substantial dis-
enfranchisement—actually the opinion stated “no voter disenfranchise-
ment”—before a new law can take effect.154  All of Justice Scalia’s 
concerns about federal courts having to review details of voting regu-
lations and the state being rigidly constricted in making changes in vot-
ing laws are brushed aside in Applewhite because “the population in-
volved includes members of some of the most vulnerable segments of 
our society (the elderly, disabled members of our community, and the 
financially disadvantaged).”155 
I know that Justice Scalia would point out that it is much more 
appropriate for a state supreme court to impose such burdens on state 
government than it is for a federal court to do so.  There is certainly 
something to that argument.  But the breakdown in American democ-
racy is not taking place state-by-state.  It is proceeding nationally. 
151. Id. at 745.
152. See PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(d) (“Any aggrieved person may file an appeal
from the final plan directly to the Supreme Court within 30 days after the filing 
thereof.  If the appellant establishes that the final plan is contrary to law, the Supreme 
Court shall issue an order remanding the plan to the commission and directing the 
commission to reapportion the Commonwealth in a manner not inconsistent with such 
order.”). 
153. 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
154.  Id. at 5.
155. Id. at 4.
2019 Taking the Threat to Democracy Seriously 1339 
These two decisions were all the more important both because 
the Chief Justice’s rhetoric was wholly accessible to the people of 
Pennsylvania and because he was a Republican Chief Justice elected 
on a partisan ballot.  There was no partisan rancor after these decisions 
were announced.  And they did strengthen democratic values, both in 
the results and in their endorsement of a fair and open political process, 
which would not be allowed to descend into warfare and ill-will. 
Unfortunately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also furnished, 
more recently, a blueprint of what courts should not do to preserve de-
mocracy.  In League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, the court held 
that the current congressional district lines constitute an unconstitu-
tional partisan gerrymander in violation of Article I, Section 5 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.156  If the court had stopped there, this deci-
sion might have been unanimous, including Republican Chief Justice 
Thomas Saylor.  Saylor dissented, not so much because he considered 
the Pennsylvania congressional map to be constitutional, but because 
of the court’s failure to grant a stay pending the decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the gerrymandering cases discussed above and be-
cause of the extraordinary process utilized by the majority during the 
entire course of the litigation, including drawing a new congressional 
district map itself.157  Criticism of the four Democratic justices in the 
case, who comprised the majority, is beyond my scope here.158  The 
point is, though, that in contrast with the consensus and bipartisan opin-
ions of Chief Justice Castille, this decision raised so much partisan ran-
cor that the Pennsylvania Republican legislative leadership threatened 
impeachment of the four justices in the narrow majority.159 
What judges should not do, therefore, however strong their com-
mitment to the preservation of democracy substantively, is to make 
156. 178 A.3d 737, 803, 818 (Pa. 2018) (considering the language of the Penn-
sylvania constitution that “[e]lections shall be free and equal”) (citing PA. CONST. art. 
I, § 5). 
157. Id. at 832–34 (Saylor, C.J., dissenting).
158. See Bruce Ledewitz, A Lost Opportunity to Reach a Consensus on Gerry-
mandering, JURIST (Feb. 13, 2018, 1:26 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commen-
tary/2018/02/pennsylvania-gerrymandering-bruce-ledewitz/. 
159. See Salena Zito, Pennsylvania Republicans Threaten Impeachment Over
Redrawn Electoral Map, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 22, 2018, 11:42 AM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/pennsylvania-republicans-threaten-impeach-
ment-over-redrawn-electoral-map. 
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things worse by rendering opinions that can be regarded as partisan. 
Obviously, the Justices in League of Women Voters felt they were up-
holding democratic values by taking effective action against gerryman-
dering.  But that view was shortsighted.  Today, unanimity in partisan 
matters is just as important as it was in Brown v. Board of Education.160 
Beyond the particular issues of voter ID and gerrymandering, is 
there any general principle that the courts could apply to a range of 
issues, including aspects of my nightmare scenarios above?  I believe 
the answer to that question is yes, and there is nothing particularly dif-
ficult about articulating the standard.  The standard could simply be the 
one utilized by Chief Justice Castille above—partisan considerations 
are not inherently unconstitutional but are unconstitutional when they 
become excessive and abusive.  And this standard could be applied in 
many different contexts.  This standard resolves the problem that 
seemed to bedevil Justice Stevens in Crawford and was mentioned by 
Chief Justice Roberts in oral argument in Gill—that the Court has al-
ways accepted a “‘certain degree of partisanship.’”161  Chief Justice 
Castille recognized that reality as a starting point, but announced a level 
of judicial oversight nevertheless. 
The criticism of this kind of standard is that it is vague.  Justice 
Scalia in Crawford was of the view that the states need clarity to govern 
elections.162  But Justice Scalia was wrong.  In a context in which pol-
iticians are tempted to go to the limit in taking advantage, the last thing 
that is desirable is clarity.  In all political matters during this emer-
gency, the law must be a terror and not a perch.163  It is best that politi-
cians know only that if they go too far, they run the risk of judicial 
intervention.  More than that, we should not wish them to know. 
160. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
161. See Nina Totenberg, Frustrated Supreme Court Looks for a Solution to
Partisan Gerrymandering, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 28, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/28/596220408/extreme-partisan-gerrymandering-the-
supreme-courts-play-in-3-acts (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts). 
162. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 208 (2018) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“This is an area where the dos and don’ts need to be known in advance 
of the election . . . .”) 
163. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, act 2, sc. 1.
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V. A CALL FOR A PRO-DEMOCRACY CAUCUS AMONG AMERICAN LAW
PROFESSORS 
Thus far, this Article has addressed issues involving what judges 
should do.  But what should the rest of us do?  Specifically, what should 
law professors do? 
One thing that is needed is a bipartisan group of American law 
professors, perhaps in an organization, but probably in a loosely-de-
fined grouping—a caucus—that promotes democratic values and urges 
the courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, to recognize the emer-
gency and to rule accordingly.  At the very least, the Justices would be 
urged to look more closely at voter ID laws, gerrymandering, and all 
other attempts by politicians to take partisan advantage. 
Having had some preliminary discussions along these lines, I 
know how difficult it is going to be to create such a group.  There are 
several reasons for the difficulty.  First, American law professors are 
just like other politically interested Americans.  That means that we are 
just as partisan as everybody else.  In fact, because we often teach in 
areas of public law, we are even more aware of past wrongs by the other 
side—Democrats refusing to seat the Republican winner of an Indiana 
Congressional seat in 1985,164 for example, or Judge Brett Ka-
vanaugh’s work for Ken Starr165—and are therefore tempted to excuse 
bad behavior by our fellow Party members.  We law professors are par-
ticipants in the threat to democracy, not mere observers.  Second, law 
professors are argumentative.  So, it will be difficult for law professors 
to concentrate on a single, narrowly defined approach.  There will be 
many different points of view.  Finally, a few of us are extremely in-
volved in the activities that constitute today’s toxic political environ-
ment.  Doubtless there were Republican law professors who were con-
sulted in creating the list from which President Trump chose his 
164. See Republicans Protest Recount of Indiana Vote, NY TIMES, Apr. 26,
1985, at B20, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/26/us/republicans-protest-recount-
of-indiana-vote.html. 
165. See Tamara Keith, Brett Kavanaugh’s Role in the Starr Investigation and
How It Shaped Him, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 17, 2018, 6:01 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/17/639670928/brett-kavanaughs-role-in-the-starr-in-
vestigation-and-how-it-shaped-him. 
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Supreme Court nominees.  Doubtless there were Democratic law pro-
fessors who counseled Democrat Senators on how to effectively op-
pose Justice Kavanaugh’s U.S. Supreme Court nomination. 
But because of these very factors, a bipartisan caucus of law 
professors that called the political parties to account, reached out to the 
Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court, and created in the public mind a 
firm commitment to democratic values—in other words, a caucus that 
took the threat to democracy seriously—could be enormously influen-
tial. 
Such a caucus could not be expected to erase the divisions 
among law professors over constitutional interpretation or substantive 
law.  Although there would be much discussion, there could be no po-
sition on a “democratic” mode of constitutional interpretation—
originalism could not be part of the values promoted—or in favor of 
certain rights, such as abortion or same-sex marriage—or even most 
free speech issues, such as the role of money in American public life.  
On all those matters, members of the caucus would have to agree to 
continue to disagree.166 
As one potential participant said to me, this leaves the caucus 
concerned with only a very modest definition of democracy—practi-
cally that the military should not take over, and elections should not be 
cancelled.  That is true, but it amounts to saying that America is closer 
to democracy’s death than we realize and that we must earnestly revi-
talize the democratic norms of tolerance and forbearance.  That is a 
narrow goal, but it may prove extremely difficult to accomplish. 
Fortunately, the two tasks in which the caucus will be engaged 
tend to point in opposite partisan directions, which will give the group 
some claim to neutrality and legitimacy.  In promoting tolerance and 
forbearance, the caucus for the moment will likely be urging Democrats 
not to raise the political stakes—not to impeach President Trump, for 
example, without some hint of bipartisan support in the Senate.  But in 
terms of its work with the Justices, the caucus will often be urging the 
U.S. Supreme Court to undo actions by Republicans. 
I can give some examples of the sort of role that such a caucus 
would play, versus the way things operate today. 
166. Perhaps the caucus would be a place of fruitful discussion that, over time,
would narrow or re-conceptualize these differences. 
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I have no doubt that most Republican law professors deplored 
the treatment received by Judge Garland and thought, at least in a the-
oretical sense, that the Senate should have confirmed him to be seated 
on the U.S. Supreme Court.  I heard Stanford law professor Michael 
McConnell, perhaps the dean of conservative American law professors, 
say these very things in a speech.167 
I have to be realistic here.  I don’t mean that Republican law 
professors are angels.  I’m sure they were also personally delighted 
with the prospect of preventing the establishment of a committed lib-
eral, five Justice majority on the U.S. Supreme Court, which was at the 
time seen as likely to grow with the election of a Democratic President 
in 2016.  I only mean that these professors recognized the norm viola-
tion that was going on and, on some level, had to have been worried 
about it.  They knew that the only reason to oppose Judge Garland’s 
nomination was a disagreement with his judicial philosophy and that 
this was not really a historically justified ground of opposition. 
At the time, I am sure they did nothing on behalf of Judge Gar-
land.  They were not, after all, called upon to try to stop the Republican 
leadership from practicing the lack of tolerance and forbearance that 
rejecting Judge Garland represented.  So, they probably just stood back. 
I am actually confident about this because I was in the same sit-
uation concerning the nomination of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  I knew that Justice Gorsuch’s nomination should not 
be opposed simply because of how he might conscientiously vote in 
controversial cases.  That kind of warfare is an example of democratic 
deterioration.  The sitting President should be able to decide on the 
basic orientation of judicial nominees.  That is why Justice Scalia, for 
example, was unanimously confirmed in 1986.  So, without evidence 
that Judge Gorsuch was an extremist and rigidly unreasonable, I had no 
principled grounds to oppose his nomination.  And, certainly, there 
were no evident grounds for a filibuster against him. 
But I did not call the office of my Democratic Senator, Robert 
Casey, to whom I have made campaign contributions and, therefore, 
could have at least gotten a hearing from some staff member, to urge 
167. The speech was given at the opening address for the 2017 Symposium at
Pepperdine Law School entitled “The Supreme Court, Politics and Reform” on April 
8, 2017.   See Pepperdine Law, Pepperdine Law Review Symposium: Opening Ad-
dress, Michael McConnell, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1GwqNoPaRGs. 
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the Senator not to filibuster the Gorsuch nomination.  I had no obliga-
tion to do this, and I was happy that the Democrats were fighting back 
after the Republicans had stolen a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court.  So, 
I did nothing. 
In retrospect, however, I was as mistaken as the conservative 
law professors were in not urging the confirmation of Judge Garland.  
We were not taking the long view.  We were not defending democratic 
values.  By our passivity and willingness to take partisan advantage, 
we were part of the threat to democracy. 
The work of the pro-democracy caucus would not just be behind 
the scenes, reaching out to politicians, but would also consist of pro-
nouncing and defending publicly the norms of tolerance and forbear-
ance.  The idea of a politically active group of knowledgeable Ameri-
cans reaching across the aisle to promote democracy in controversial 
contexts would receive a lot of attention. 
In trying to convince the Justices, on the other hand, behind the 
scenes work would be more important than simply filing another ami-
cus brief.  The Justices undoubtedly are beginning to worry about de-
mocracy.  They would also be aware of the creation of a bipartisan cau-
cus of law professors condemning, for example, voter ID laws, 
gerrymandering, and if it came to that, manipulation of the Electoral 
College.  But the Justices would also have to know that they would 
have support from “their side” if they broke Party ranks in important 
political cases.  Contacts like these go on now between law professors 
and the chambers of Supreme Court Justices and in private conversa-
tions at meetings and events.  Politically connected members of the 
caucus would urge the Justices to rethink their usual Party alignments. 
As stated above, originalism does not counsel allowing democracy to 
die, even if extraordinary judicial efforts to save it become necessary. 
I don’t know whether establishing the caucus is possible or is 
just a pipe dream.  It may even be that the attempt to create it, even just 
discussing it, will have some of the benefits that the caucus itself would 
have.  All I know is that I don’t want to wake up one day to find that 
our democracy has ended and then wonder why I had not done more to 
try to prevent it. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: WHY DID WE GET HERE?
Why do politicians, and then whole populations, cease to prac-
tice tolerance and forbearance?  Once the process starts, it is demon-
strably hard to stop.  But why does it get started in the first place? 
Levitsky and Ziblatt do not have much to say about that—they tell us 
how democracies die, but not why.  In Europe in the 1930s, decades of 
war and economic dislocation can be blamed.  But this is not the case 
in all their historical examples, and it is certainly not the case with re-
gard to America in the period they are studying—roughly 1978 to the 
present.  Wage stagnation is not sufficient to explain how Americans 
came to be so deeply distrusting of each other.168 
At a recent meeting I had with another potential participant in 
the pro-democracy caucus, this question of why came up.  The profes-
sor’s response was to lament the current unwillingness in American 
politics to take the long view.  A lot of the things that are bothering us 
have happened before and there are ebbs and flows.  Why is it that 
Americans are now so on edge and so unwilling to be patient? 
Pondering that observation brought me back to a famous teach-
ing by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.:  “[E]ven though the arc of the moral 
universe is long, it bends toward justice.”169  When you believe that, as 
did Dr. King, you can trust in the universe to eventually right current 
wrongs.  This may be why Dr. King could work so patiently, actually 
loving his opponents and hoping for their eventual conversion. 
This faith is also the reason that Dr. King never worried all that 
much about defining justice.  From his perspective, justice had power 
in history, and so to speak, we did not have to define it because it would 
define us. 
Something along the lines of Dr. King’s teaching may be neces-
sary for democracy to work.  We must believe that our fellow citizens 
will have the wisdom to recognize justice and that our society will 
move in that direction.  If instead we believe that our culture is captive 
168. The authors do suggest that to some extent tolerance and forbearance were
premised on an agreement that white rule would be preserved and not challenged in 
certain states.  LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 124–25.  Once this post-Recon-
struction consensus began to break down, so did democratic norms. 
169. Love, Law, and Civil Disobedience, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 43, 52 (James 
Melvin Washington ed., 1986). 
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to the whims of modernity, which is what the Right tends to believe, or 
is captive to the lies of dark money, which is what the Left tends to 
believe, democracy is worthless and will eventually pass away.  Our 
nihilism may be why our democracy is threatened. 
I mention this because, while hard work is needed right now to 
shore up our tattered democratic tradition, when this work is com-
pleted, as hopefully it will be, and the emergency recedes, as hopefully 
it will, we must still ask, why did it almost happen here? 
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VII.     AN ADDENDUM IN LIGHT OF THE 2018 ELECTION RESULTS 
The editors were kind enough to permit me to add a short reflec-
tion on the results of the November 2018 Midterm Election:  those re-
sults were mixed.  The Democrats narrowly retook the House of Rep-
resentatives.170  The Republicans slightly increased their majority in the 
Senate.171  Neither side could claim popular vindication—or both 
could. 
Behind that surface result, however, lay a troubling reality for 
Republicans.  Despite a booming economy, President Trump was una-
ble to enlarge his base of support.  A very favorable political map of 
races mostly caused the positive Senate result.  There had been 26 
Democratic seats in play and only nine Republican seats.172  In other 
words, nothing about the 2018 results could give Republicans confi-
dence about 2020.  It could appear to them that the 2020 election could 
result in Democratic majorities in both Houses of Congress and a Dem-
ocratic President.173  Since President Trump will almost certainly be 
the Republican nominee, only something very unexpected could 
change this scenario. 
Given this likelihood, Republicans could respond by dramati-
cally changing course.  President Trump could reach across the politi-
cal aisle.  The Republicans could put some Democrats on the federal 
courts.  They could even confirm Judge Garland to a seat on the U.S. 
 
 170. Live Midterm Results: House Races, WASH. POST, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/election-results/house/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1b4fcf0de418 (last 
updated Mar. 7, 2019, 8:20 AM). 
 171. Live Midterm Results: Senate Races, WASH. POST, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/election-results/senate/?utm_term=.0559d9e92aeb (last updated Mar. 7, 
2019, 8:20 AM). 
 172. Amber Phillips, The Fix’s Top 10 Senate Races Show Democrats with a 
(Narrow) Opening to Win the Senate, WASH. POST (July 20, 2018), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/07/20/the-top-10-senate-races-give-demo-
crats-a-narrow-opening-to-win-the-senate/?utm_term=.32fc21b19e89. 
 173. This is by no means a certainty.  There are analysts who argue that it will 
be difficult for the Democrats to win back the Senate in 2020 even if the Party defeats 
President Trump and holds on to its House majority.  See Philip Klein, Republican 
Gains May Have Put Senate Out of Reach for 2020 Democrats, WASH. EXAMINER, 
(Nov. 7, 2018, 8:24 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/republican-
gains-may-have-put-senate-out-of-reach-for-2020-democrats. 
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Supreme Court, in a dramatic gesture of nonpartisanship, should one of 
the current liberals retire. 
But given what the reader has read here, it is obvious that this is 
unlikely to happen.  President Trump responded to the 2018 Election 
results by immediately firing Attorney General Jeff Sessions, in an ap-
parent effort to limit the Russia Investigation.174  Nor is there any rea-
son to believe that the Democrats would respond in equal political good 
faith to any such Republican effort. 
It is much more likely that the Republicans will react by taking 
every advantage while they still can.  And the Democrats will respond 
in kind.  In that event, the next year and a half will bring more recrim-
inations and bitterness, more partisan and controversial judicial nomi-
nees whom the Democrats will be helpless to prevent, perhaps a failed 
presidential impeachment attempt, and in general, more national dis-
trust. 
The worst possibility of all would be the retirement of Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsberg in early 2020.  Republicans might cynically 
change their tune and quickly put one more ideological conservative on 
the U.S. Supreme Court before the 2020 election, mirroring the Judge 
Merrick Garland episode.175  Such an event would render a Court-pack-
ing plan from the Democrats almost inevitable.176 
The question remains, how do we save our constitutional de-
mocracy?  In some ways, the problem is the same one that has pre-
vented effective action regarding climate change.  We humans tend to 
see immediate issues rather than long-term threats.  In politics, we are 
 
 174. Eric Lach, Trump Fires Jeff Sessions, and Throws His Administration into 
Chaos, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/cur-
rent/trump-fires-jeff-sessions-and-throws-his-administration-back-into-chaos. 
 175. Following the February 2016 death of Justice Antonin Scalia, President 
Barack Obama nominated Federal Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court on 
March 16, 2016.  Almost immediately after Justice Scalia’s death, Senate majority 
leader, Mitch McConnell, ruled out any vote on a successor before a new President 
was installed in January 2017.  No vote was taken and no hearings were held on the 
Garland nomination.  Elving, supra note 73. 
 176. Even before the Election, there were hints that Democrats were becoming 
more comfortable with the specter of Court packing as a response to Republican judi-
cial nomination efforts.  See Editorial Board, The Supreme Court Confirmation Cha-
rade, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/01/opinion/ka-
vanaugh-supreme-court-confirmation.html, for the extraordinarily offhand acceptance 
of this idea. 
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so fixated on winning in the short run that we forget that we might all 
be losing in the longer run.  So, the first steps are to acknowledge the 
danger, admit our own complicity in causing it, and accept personal 
responsibility for preventing possible catastrophe.  We can counsel re-
straint among our political allies.177  We can urge the courts to forego 
Party loyalties.  We can accept that the stakes are high and immediate.  
We can only save ourselves by acting as if there is an emergency in 
which business as usual is no longer acceptable.  Because that is the 
case. 
 
 177. In one very encouraging recent development, conservative academics and 
lawyers have joined together to form Checks and Balances, a group dedicated to call-
ing President Trump to account for abuses of power.  About Checks & Balances, 
CHECKS & BALANCES, https://checks-and-balances.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 26, 
2019).  This development could lead to the formation of the larger type of group I call 
for in this paper in which law professors call their own “side” to account for violations 
of democratic norms.  See supra Part V. 
